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This study focuses on how founding institutions impact intraorganizational capabili-
ties and how such imprints may have different external manifestations in subsequent
historical eras. We introduce the concept of exaptation to organizational theory,
identifying an important process whereby the historical origin of a capability differs
from its current usefulness. Three founding conditions—branching policy, moderniza-
tion, and political culture—influenced banks’ development of capabilities for manag-
ing dispersed branches, and these capabilities subsequently led to variation in banks’
propensity to engage in acquisitions.
Men make their own history, but they do not make it
as they please . . . but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past.
-Karl Marx
Why and how does the past continue to influence
the present? In a classic sociological statement,
Stinchcombe theorized that organizations founded
in a given external environment “must construct
their social systems with the social resources avail-
able” and that their social systems (e.g., internal
structures, processes, and cultural features) main-
tain this founding imprint primarily because “tra-
ditionalizing forces, the vesting of interests, and . . .
ideologies may tend to preserve the structure”
(1965: 168–169). Subsequent organizational stud-
ies have supported what has come to be known as
Stinchcombe’s imprinting hypothesis regarding the
enduring influence of founding environments. For
example, differences in founding conditions at
least partly predict contemporary variation in firm
strategies (Boeker, 1988; Kimberly, 1975), firm
growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), rates of
organizational change (Tucker, Singh, & Meinhard,
1990), organizational structure (Meyer & Brown,
1977), and organizational mortality (Carroll & Han-
nan, 1989; Romanelli, 1989; Swaminathan, 1996).
But research building on Stinchcombe’s insight
has been surprisingly narrow, focusing mainly on
resource and market environments that are directly
related to organizations’ economic performance
and competitiveness (Johnson, 2007; Lounsbury &
Ventresca, 2002), such as population density that
affects organizational resource environments (Car-
roll & Hannan, 1989; Swaminathan, 1996), industry
sales and concentration (Eisenhardt & Schoon-
hoven, 1990; Romanelli, 1989), market stages
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), and technology
(Marquis, 2003). Although such environments are
important, they are only a small portion of the
“richly textured n-dimensional space in which or-
ganizations navigate” (Lounsbury & Ventresca,
2002: 3). Relatively little attention has been paid to
other essential components of a firm’s environ-
ment, such as public policy and cultural factors
(Scott, 2001; Stinchcombe, 1965). As Johnson ob-
served, institutional environments at founding, es-
pecially deep-seated beliefs and norms, “appear . . .
not only in the form of resources that can be stra-
tegically mobilized but also in the form of schemas
and discourses” (2007: 118) that have a persis-
tent subsequent impact on organizations. Thus,
Lounsbury and Ventresca called for revisiting
Stinchcombe’s (1965) statement about social struc-
ture in order to stimulate more “institutionally-rich
studies” (2002: 3).
Such a focus can fill critical gaps in understand-
ing of the imprinting of founding environments and
contribute to institutional research by showing
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how and why past institutional environments con-
tinue to influence contemporary organizational be-
haviors. Prior institutionally oriented imprinting
research has only shown that firms founded in
different time periods—and therefore presumably
different environments—exhibit variation in their
contemporary structures and behaviors (Kimberly,
1975; Meyer & Brown, 1977; Tucker, Singh, & Mei-
nard, 1990). But attempting to discern institutional
influences through time period effects only rough-
ly captures founding institutional conditions
(Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006). More importantly,
as Johnson (2007) noted, a limitation of imprinting
research is that the main focus is on demonstrating
the links between macrolevel conditions at found-
ing and subsequent organizational outcomes while
remaining largely speculative about the intraorgan-
izational processes that create the observed links.
This study responds to this critique and to
Lounsbury and Ventresca’s (2002) call to reorient
imprinting research to be more “institutionally-
rich” by identifying and theorizing intraorgani-
zational processes through which founding insti-
tutional environments imprint organizations.
Institutional environments, be they formal rules
such as public policy and laws (North, 1990; Scott,
2001) or informal beliefs and norms reflected in
culture (Douglas, 1986; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Sel-
znick, 1949), explicitly or implicitly delineate be-
havioral boundaries for organizations. When entre-
preneurs adapt to external pressures at the
founding of their organizations, institutional envi-
ronments (e.g., public policy and political culture
that are present at the time of founding) are likely to
be internalized as they are reflected in organization-
al processes, routines, structures, and cultural tem-
plates, which broadly constitute organizational ca-
pabilities (Helfat, 2003; Winter, 2003). These
organizational capabilities frequently are institu-
tionalized and thus persist as they become reposi-
tories of organizational knowledge (Baron, Hannan,
& Burton, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kriauciunas
& Kale, 2006; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Tripsas,
1997), and since actors in organizations become
cognitively committed to inherited cultural scripts
and routines (David 1994; Johnson, 2007; Reger &
Palmer, 1996; Selznick, 1949; Zucker, 1977). Be-
cause of these processes of intraorganizational in-
ertia, the legacy of founding institutional condi-
tions is imprinted in organizations.
But institutionalized organizational capabilities,
developed as adaptive responses to founding insti-
tutional conditions, may also be exapted for new
uses that are different from original uses but made
possible by external environmental changes. “Ex-
aptation,” a concept developed by evolutionary bi-
ologists, refers to a process in which features
adapted for a particular purpose in a particular
environment are used for another purpose in a
subsequent environment (Gould, 1980, 1991). For
example, the bladder that fish developed initially
for buoyancy during swimming subsequently be-
came usable as a lung, allowing animals to breathe
on land. Similarly, the compact disc, originally
conceived as a more durable replacement for vinyl
phonograph records, subsequently became used as
a data storage medium for computers (Dew, Saras-
vathy, & Venkataraman, 2004). We find that im-
printed capabilities originally developed for bank
branch management became useful for a new pur-
pose—bank acquisition management and integra-
tion—after an environmental shift. We thus
uncover a rarely attended-to imprinting phenome-
non: deeply established and often unobservable or-
ganizational capabilities developed as adaptive re-
sponses to founding conditions may result in
different external manifestations as environmental
conditions change. In previous studies, imprinting
effects have been assumed to be shown by the same
external features or behaviors of firms being main-
tained entirely or partially over time (e.g., Boeker,
1988; Meyer & Brown, 1977), obscuring less visible
and often unanticipated manifestations of founding
imprints.
Our empirical context is the U.S. banking indus-
try, which has a number of features useful for in-
vestigating our theoretical issues. First, histori-
cally, federal and state-level legislation has limited
banks’ activities to the state in which they were
headquartered. As a result, the 48 contiguous U.S.
states were characterized by unique institutional
environments before deregulation of the industry
in 1978, so the industry constituted a natural labo-
ratory in which to investigate how founding insti-
tutional environments imprinted organizations.
Two particular institutional conditions were im-
portant for bank operation and growth: state
branching policy, which governed the extent to
which banks could establish branches outside of
the city in which they were headquartered, and a
political culture that constituted a resistance to the
encroachment of large corporations. The process of
modernization enabled banks to take advantage of
increasingly expansive public policy, but cultural
beliefs that valorized community control of bank-
ing limited bank expansion (Marquis & Huang,
2009; Roe, 1994; Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008).
We highlight two particular manifestations of the
specific political culture prevalent at the time of
the founding of many banks—local agrarianism and
the Progressive movement—and examine: (1) social
movements of agrarians mobilized by the Grange
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(Schneiberg et al., 2008), (2) the presence of actors
that identified with agrarian values (Marquis &
Huang, 2009; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), and (3)
popular opinion aligned with Progressivism (Have-
man, Rao, & Paruchuri, 2007).
Second, banks founded in states in which insti-
tutional environments encouraged them to estab-
lish many branches were more likely to develop the
necessary capabilities for managing these branches
at founding. To the extent that these capabilities
could be “exapted” to help a bank realize acquisi-
tion management and integration, seen at the time
to be a significant competitive advantage (Winter &
Szulanski, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002), the period
following the industry deregulation starting in
1978 provides a rare opportunity to detect the im-
printed capabilities that resulted from banks’
founding institutional environments. As we theo-
rize and analyze below, some banks, because of
founding institutional environments that fostered
or retarded the development of capabilities for
managing dispersed branches, may have been bet-
ter equipped than other banks to compete via ac-
quisition following deregulation.
We used multiple methods and a number of re-
search strategies to establish that founding institu-
tional environments imprinted banks by creating
variation in their development of the capabilities
needed to manage dispersed branches. Given the
extremely long study window necessary for im-
printing research, it was not possible to measure
organizational capabilities directly for each bank.
So, first, we conducted extensive historical analy-
ses of four different types of materials to under-
stand the external environments of early U.S. banks
and how they differed in their organizational capa-
bilities: (1) early banking industry periodicals, (2)
historical series of early bank annual reports, (3)
proceedings of conferences on banking operations
and publications of state and national banking as-
sociations, and (4) secondary sources on banking
history, banking processes, and individual bank
histories. We used these materials to ground our
hypotheses.1 Second, our analytical strategy was to
develop corollary hypotheses to triangulate and
elaborate the underlying imprinting mechanisms.
Besides theorizing about the effects of founding
institutional conditions, we considered moderniza-
tion processes as contingencies to our hypothe-
sized policy effects, as previous studies have sug-
gested (e.g., Haveman & Rao, 1997; Marquis &
Huang, 2009). Finally, we quantitatively analyzed a
database of over 200,000 observations of the ap-
proximately 25,000 U.S. banks that existed from
1978 to 2001. To account for plausible alternative
explanations, we included many relevant control
variables and conducted supplementary analyses
to more closely examine the proposed mechanism
that created the imprinting effect.
Below, we develop historically informed theory
and hypotheses about the effect of founding public
policy and political cultural environments on
banks’ intraorganizational capabilities and how
those capabilities can be useful in a subsequent
historical environment that encourages acquisi-
tions. Our results generally support our hypothe-
ses. Taken as a whole, the broader implications of
our contributions are that institutions have a com-
plex and chronologically multilayered influence on
organizations: Organizational behavior is shaped
by both present and past institutional pressures,
and both influences operate through intraorganiza-
tional processes.
FOUNDING INSTITUTIONS, EXAPTATION,
AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S.
COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY
Since the late 1970s, the numerous U.S. indus-
tries that have undergone extensive deregulatory
pressure have proven to be a fertile context in
which to further understanding of the effects of
environmental change on organizations (Haveman,
Russo, & Meyer, 2001; Lounsbury, Hirsch, & Klink-
erman, 1998). In particular, the U.S. banking indus-
try has been dramatically transformed over the 30
years since extensive deregulation began in 1978
(Berger, Kashyap, & Scalise, 1994; Calomiris, 2000;
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). It was believed at the
time that the U.S. banking system, composed of
many small, local banks, was inefficient and ill-
suited to compete globally. As a result, the govern-
ment initiated a series of deregulatory actions with
the specific goal of driving consolidation through
acquisitions in order to reduce the number and
increase the average size of banks (Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007; Stiroh & Poole, 2000).
Previously, a bank’s growth and expansion had
been limited to the state its headquarters were in.
But a series of legal changes broadened banks’ po-
tential markets, so banks from the contiguous
states’ 48 diverse institutional, economic, and tech-
nological environments began competing with one
another on a national scale. During this period,
both shifts in the external environment (Berger et
al., 1994; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) and chang-
1 Space considerations prevent us from fully describ-
ing our historical approach. A detailed summary of these
historical materials and methods is available from the
authors upon request.
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ing ideas about the benefits of scale and efficiency
(Stiroh & Strahan, 2003) motivated banks to grow.
Substantial evidence points to consolidation as the
defining feature of this period (Davis & Mizruchi,
1999; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) and to acquiring
other banks as the means by which banks have
subsequently grown and prospered (Stiroh & Poole,
2000). The resulting acquisition market was intense
and profoundly changed the industry. As shown in
Figure 1, industry assets grew significantly from
1980 to 2001, while the number of commercial
banks shrank from nearly 13,000 to fewer than
7,000. Figure 2 portrays the extensive number of
bank acquisitions in the U.S. between 1978 and
2001, averaging 200 per year and exceeding 300 in
a few of those years.
Despite the sheer number of acquisitions, banks
exhibited considerable variation in the intensity of
their acquisition activities. What accounts for such
variation? Existing research and our own historical
investigation suggest that (1) banks’ possession of
certain capabilities may partially account for their
greater propensity to acquire other banks during
this period of transition from state environments to
a national environment, and (2) these capabilities
may have been exapted from branch management
capabilities that these banks developed as adaptive
responses to founding institutional conditions.
Banks acquire other banks to expand their geo-
graphic and/or product markets by converting ac-
quired banks into local affiliates or branches (Win-
ter & Szulanski, 2001). To make this growth
strategy work, it was important to successfully in-
tegrate and manage acquired banks (Winter & Szu-
lanski, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Studies of bank
acquisition procedures (Szulanski, 2000; Winter &
Szulanski, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004) have docu-
mented the complexity of integration and sug-
gested that well-developed integration and coordi-
nation processes are likely to be a key strategic
advantage for banks that engage in acquisitions and
that possessing these capabilities results in a
greater likelihood that those banks will acquire oth-
ers. In other words, banks possessing such capabil-
ities may be more likely to conceive of and thus to
engage in acquisitions than other banks.
Furthermore, banks’ capabilities for integrating
and managing acquired banks might have been ex-
apted from existing capabilities that were originally
developed for a different purpose: branch manage-
ment. Banks that had already developed capabili-
ties in managing dispersed branches were at advan-
tage in the sense that they could deploy their
branch management capabilities to integrate and
manage acquired banks. In more general terms, the
characteristic that raised the fitness of banks in this
new environment (i.e., acquisition capabilities) had
a nonadaptive origin (Dew, 2007): early experience
with branching.
Table 1 summarizes how the exaptation between
branch management and acquisition can occur. Our
historical investigations uncovered the typical pro-
FIGURE 1
Number of Banks and Total Banking Assets (Inflation Adjusted), 1978–2001
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cedures and infrastructures branching banks devel-
oped to manage dispersed branches, and we sug-
gest that these procedures and infrastructures are
likely to be instrumental for banks’ acquisitions.
After a bank acquires other banks, it needs to de-
termine and manage its relationships with the ac-
quired banks (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Win-
ter & Szulanski, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Many
questions arise. For example, How should acquisi-
tions be monitored? How should business transac-
tions between a bank and its acquired banks be
constructed? What management and operational
procedures should be used in the acquired banks?
Research has shown that, regardless of how much
autonomy a bank gives to its acquired affiliates,
having a set of well established routines, proce-
dures, and infrastructure elements is critical for
managing relationships with acquired affiliates and
thus making acquisitions work (Winter & Szulan-
ski, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). To the extent that
branching management needs to address a similar
set of issues, such intraorganizational capabilities
for managing branches provide an advantage in
pursuing acquisition as a growth strategy.
Exaptation emphasizes that certain features de-
veloped as adaptive responses to initial environ-
mental conditions can be well suited for some new
purposes after environmental changes (Dew et al.,
2004; Gould, 1991). The concept provides a partic-
ularly useful tool that can guide understanding of
how founding institutions imprint organizations,
in that although external environments change, or-
ganizational behaviors may enact adaptive re-
sponses to those changes in a way that reflects the
organizations’ founding conditions. Figure 3 de-
picts both our general model of imprinting and
exaptation and the specific application to the U.S.
commercial banking industry analyzed in this
study. The basic causal process proposed to con-
nect the historical period of origin with the con-
temporary period of use is as follows: founding
institutional conditions lead to initial organization-
al structures and processes that enable banks’ geo-
graphical dispersion (Marquis & Huang, 2009); this
early experience provides durable capabilities for
managing dispersed units (Zollo & Singh, 2004);
and, following the deregulation that allowed banks
to dramatically expand their businesses to inter-
state markets, banks with these imprinted capabil-
ities then were more likely to engage in subsequent
acquisitions of other banks.
Of particular importance for our research pur-
poses are the imprinting effects of early institu-
tional factors such as public policy and political
culture. Prior to 1978, states varied considerably in
their branching policies, which govern the ability
of banks to establish geographically dispersed
branches outside of a headquarters location (Roe,
1994). Banks pursuing the dispersed strategy
needed to manage dispersed branches and there-
fore develop corresponding capabilities, but banks
pursuing a concentrated strategy of focusing on a
limited geographic area did not. We have shown
(Marquis & Huang, 2009) that which strategy banks
pursued and thus whether they developed capabil-
ities for managing multiple units were influenced
by branching policy and other features of the exter-
nal environment in a state. We thus consider how
FIGURE 2
Number of Bank Acquisitions, 1978–2001
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being founded in a branching state influences sub-
sequent acquisitions.
States also varied considerably in political cul-
ture, specifically, on the presence of a set of beliefs
focused on resistance to large corporations, which
promoted community-oriented banking as opposed
to the unlimited growth of large banks (Akhavein,
Goldberg, & White, 2004; Calomiris, 2000; Roe,
1994). This set of beliefs is part of a larger, general
and deep-seated mistrust of centralized power seen
throughout American history (Lipset, 1963; de
Tocqueville, 1835/2000; Mills, 1956). Historical re-
TABLE 1
Applicability of Bank Branch Management Capabilities to Bank Acquisition Management and Integration
Management
Capabilities Developed
by Branching
Examples of Use in Bank Branch
Management
Examples of Applicability to Bank Acquisition
Management and Integration
Monitoring Infrastructures and Routines
Centralized management
reporting system
In many cases, having a separate set of books
at the headquarters was required by law
(AIB, 1923).
Although Banc One’s constituent banks were given
substantial operational freedom, the key to high
performance for the bank was their centralized
reporting system (McCoy, Frieder, & Hedges,
1994; Winter & Szulanski, 2001).
Bank of America’s success in establishing
early branch offices in Los Angeles, the
result of centralized management reporting
system (James & James, 1954).
Communication with
and socialization of
agents
Management meetings between headquarters
and branch managers, and traveling
auditors from the headquarters visiting
branches frequently cited as standard
practice of branch management at Bank of
America (Chapman & Westerfield, 1942);
Comerica Bank (Comerica, 1999); Dollar
Savings and Trust Company (AIB, 1924),
Citibank (Mayer, 1997).
Internal committees, conferences, and management
travel connect dispersed parts of the organiza-
tion set up following acquisitions (Covington &
Ellis, 1993; McCoy, Frieder, & Hedges, 1994).
During conversion, Banc One trained the
personnel of acquired banks (Winter &
Szulanski, 2001), and further, codified staffing
procedures were important to integrate acquired
banks (Zollo & Singh, 2004).
General Business Processes and Routines
Routinized transaction
processing
Transit department and transfer processes for
currency and draft between headquarter
and branches essential for branch
management (e.g., AIB, 1926; Covington &
Ellis, 1993).
Well-established routines for transactions between
the acquired and acquirers are important as
newly acquired banks are converted into local
branches (Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Zollo &
Singh, 2004).
Standardization (and
replication) of internal
processes
Best practices in branch management
articulated as including common
collections procedures, check routing and
sorting mechanisms, and standardized
management processes (Chapman &
Westerfield, 1942).
Aligning and centralizing systems, procedures, and
products increases postacquisition performance
(Zollo & Singh, 2004).
Banc One’s success in growing through acquisition
depended on its success in replicating its own
computer systems, programs, and operating
procedures in acquired banks (Winter &
Szulanski, 2001).
Information processing Duplication and bookkeeping processes
essential to maintain standardization and
consistency (Chapman & Westerfield, 1942;
James & James, 1954).
Banc One’s local information systems were fully
integrated into the overall information system,
so that the headquarters has full access to local
information (Winter & Szulanski, 2001).
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search has identified two important manifestations
of this political culture condition that may play a
role in bank activities: local agrarianism and Pro-
gressivism. Local agrarianism comprised efforts to
promote the interests of farmers and local commu-
nities through either organized social movements
(Schneiberg et al., 2008) or ongoing actions of in-
dividuals (Marquis & Huang, 2009). Progressivism
was a more widespread ideology, one thrust of
which was the need for dispersed power and op-
position to monopoly of all sorts, particularly mo-
nopolies of large corporations resulting from mod-
ernization (Brandeis, 1914; Kolko, 1963; Rodgers,
1982; Tindall & Shi, 1999; Wiebe, 1967).
We suggest that these two institutional condi-
tions, when present at the time of banks’ foundings,
were likely to imprint the banks by shaping the
initial development of intraorganizational capabil-
ities for managing dispersed branches. It is well
established in institutional research that formal
rules create coercive pressure for organizations to
conform, and informal beliefs and norms exert their
impact to the extent that conformity confers legiti-
macy in the eyes of key audiences (Scott, 2001).
Thus, institutions such as policy and political cul-
ture explicitly or implicitly delineate behavioral
boundaries and templates for organizations (DiM-
aggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; North,
1990; Selznick, 1949). When creating new organi-
zations, entrepreneurs are often constrained to act
within the boundaries set by institutional condi-
tions. These models often persist when they are
institutionalized within organizations (Baron et al.,
1999; Johnson, 2007). Providing observations more
specific to the banking industry, Reger and Palmer
showed in their study of how banks responded to
deregulation that “managers relied on cognitive
maps that reflected obsolete industry boundaries
rather than configurations representative of the de-
regulated marketplace” (1996: 22). And other re-
searchers have similarly highlighted how idiosyn-
cratic interfirm conventions such as information
channels, leadership conventions, and role types,
which become established early in organizations,
led to institutional persistence (Beckman & Burton,
2008; Burton & Beckman, 2007; David, 1994). We
argue that one manifestation of branch manage-
ment capabilities imprinted during a bank’s found-
ing is a greater propensity to engage in acquisitions
after banking deregulation began in 1978.
Below, we develop a set of historically grounded
hypotheses to elaborate the arguments outlined
TABLE 1
Continued
Management
Capabilities Developed
by Branching
Examples of Use in Bank Branch
Management
Examples of Applicability to Bank Acquisition
Management and Integration
Organizational Design and Structure
Centralized hierarchy Centralized structure seen as best practice:
“The best way to proceed in selling the
service of branch banks is to center
everything in connection with it at the
main office.” (AIB, 1924)
Centralization as part of integration shown to
increase postacquisition performance (Zollo &
Singh, 2004).
Regional organizational
infrastructures
Bank of America’s early regional organiza-
tion structure credited for why it was able
to expand its branch network rapidly
(James & James, 1954).
Frequent acquirers, Banc One and Nations Bank,
used a geographic organizational structure—all
functional business lines reported through a
regional infrastructure (Covington & Ellis, 1993;
Phillips, 2001).
Cultural Templates
Identity as an
organization
Banks with branching experience “think” in
ways that promote geographic expansion
(Covington & Ellis, 1993; McCoy, Frieder,
& Hedges, 1994). Banks in rural areas have
community-focused names reflecting a
deep commitment on the part of these
banks to remaining as single-unit organiza-
tions (e.g., Brockman, 1956)
The name NationsBank was explicitly chosen to
make bank expansion and geographically
dispersed acquisitions easier (Covington & Ellis,
1993).
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above. We first examine how the branching policy
in a state at a bank’s time of founding (“founding
branching policy”) affected banks’ contemporary
acquisition activities by considering both its main
effect and its interaction with modernization of
transportation technology and urbanization. We
then examine how a founding political culture of
local agrarianism and Progressivism affected banks’
contemporary acquisition activities by conceiving
of these cultural conditions as constraints that
dampened the imprinting effect of founding
branching policy.
Founding Legal Environment and
Intraorganizational Coordination Capabilities
Throughout U.S. history banking, has been
heavily regulated at both the state and federal lev-
els (Roe, 1994). Until deregulation, states had dif-
ferent laws concerning whether or not banks could
establish offices in locations other than their head-
quarters. There were two “ideal types” of branching
laws: Unit banking laws restricted banks’ opera-
tions to a single location, precluding branches, and
statewide banking laws permitted banks to operate
branches throughout a state. Some states had hy-
brid legislation, limited statewide banking, which
permitted branch operation within a clearly delin-
eated geographic area.
There is considerable historical evidence that
banks in states with less restrictive branching pol-
icies were more likely to pursue a dispersed strat-
egy, establishing branches outside of their head-
quarters locations (Marquis & Huang, 2009). When
banks pursue a dispersed strategy, their intraorgan-
izational activities are typically characterized by
pooled interdependence (Nadler & Tushman,
1997), whereby “each part renders a discrete con-
tribution to the whole and each is supported by the
whole” (Thompson, 1967: 54). Such interdepen-
dencies create coordination challenges for banks.
For example, in an address to the 1928 conference
of the American Institute of Banking (AIB; the ed-
ucational arm of the American Bankers Associa-
tion), a Bank of America executive highlighted the
need for standardization and consistency of bank
services provided in outlying branches (Langeard,
Bateson, Lovelock, & Eiglier, 1981). Because of
these issues, centralized management was consid-
ered the best practice of branch management at the
time. “Experience has proved,” it was observed at
the 1924 AIB meeting, “that the best way to proceed
in selling the service of branch banks is to center
everything in connection with it at the main of-
fice.” For the same reason, centralization was
sometimes a legal requirement for banks pursuing
the dispersed strategy; in Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, branch offices were required to keep their en-
tire set of customer and account documents at the
central office (AIB, 1923).
The need for centralized management of
branches and for the associated standardization led
banks to develop many important coordination
mechanisms for managing outlying locations. For
example, Bank of America, a San Francisco bank,
established an early set of branches in Los Angeles
and developed corresponding infrastructure and
processes to manage them (Chapman &Westerfield,
1942), including a network of auditors and system-
atic reporting functions for monitoring branch ac-
tivities, common collections procedures, check
routing and sorting mechanisms, and standardized
management processes (Chapman & Westerfield,
1942; James & James, 1954). These infrastructures
and processes as a whole constituted Bank of
America’s capabilities for centrally managing dis-
persed branches.
For Bank of America and many other banks, such
capabilities, initially developed in response to the
branching law in a particular state at the time of the
bank’s founding, became part of the bank’s reper-
toire of knowledge, whether formally codified or
informally stored as organizational tradition and
culture (Nelson & Winter, 1982). As a result, such
capabilities persistently affect the banks to the ex-
tent that they could be easily retrieved when
needed (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Persistence was
also possible because actors in organizations tend
to follow inherited organizational scripts and rou-
tines (David, 1994; Johnson, 2007; Selznick, 1949;
Zucker, 1977). For example, in their case study of
two similar companies founded by the same family
under different ideological systems (socialism and
capitalism), Kogut and Zander (2000) observed that
the two companies developed different capabilities
and routines regarding innovation, resulting in dif-
ferent innovation rates. Such differences persisted
even when the environment changed dramatically,
following the collapse of communism in East
Germany.
To the extent that banks’ capabilities for manag-
ing geographically dispersed branches—developed
in response to the institutional environments at
founding—tend to persist, they are likely to pro-
vide contemporary strategic advantages for banks
pursuing growth through acquisitions after the
1978 deregulation. Historians have asserted that
such a link exists, postulating that the coordination
capabilities that Bank of America developed early
on subsequently allowed it to grow, particularly via
acquisitions (James & James, 1954). More generally,
researchers have shown such capabilities to be es-
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sential for the growth of multiunit organizations
(Greve & Baum, 2001). For instance, Ingram (1996)
showed how the development of hotel accounting,
a systematic method of tracking outlying locations,
led to the growth of hotel chains. Regarding bank
acquisition capabilities, replicating some of the
home institution’s procedures in acquired organi-
zations is central to the acquisition process (Winter
& Szulanski, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). This
would be considerably easier for banks that already
have management structures and processes for ad-
dressing geographically dispersed operations.
Zollo and colleagues (Zollo & Singh, 2004; Zollo &
Winter, 2002) have suggested that the same type of
codification of procedures and capabilities detailed
in our historical investigations of early branching
manuals likely facilitates acquirers’ integration of
satellite organizations. As noted above, historical
records provide numerous details of interunit co-
ordination practices and structures developed early
by banks founded in states allowing statewide
branching. In keeping with research on the institu-
tional persistence of such capabilities (David, 1994;
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Reger & Palmer, 1996), we
therefore suspect that, under current legislation en-
couraging acquisitions, when such capabilities take
on increased importance (Zollo & Singh, 2004;
Zollo & Winter, 2002), banks founded in states al-
lowing statewide branching enjoy a competitive
advantage over banks founded in unit-banking
states, where such coordination practices and
structures were not as salient.
Hypothesis 1. Banks founded in states in which
statewide banking was unrestricted are more
likely to grow by acquisition following deregu-
lation than banks founded in other states.
Modernization Processes at Founding and Bank
Geographical Expansion
Although laws may be a necessary condition for
bank expansion, they are often not sufficient; bank
expansion has typically required available re-
sources to support geographic growth (Marquis &
Huang, 2009). Haveman and Rao (1997) observed
that in the early 20th century, a particularly impor-
tant external environmental change was modern-
ization, which had great influence on organization-
al forms. Therefore we consider two other founding
environmental conditions related to the modern-
ization of the U.S. that are particularly important
for banking: development of transportation tech-
nology, and urbanization. We suggest that technol-
ogy environment and urbanization at founding are
likely to accentuate the imprinting effect of branch-
ing policy on banks’ propensity to engage in acqui-
sitions after 1978.
Founding technology environment. The extent
to which branching policy will affect banks’ devel-
opment of capabilities to manage dispersed
branches depends in part on transportation tech-
nology. For instance, in earlier research (Marquis &
Huang, 2009), we showed that in U.S. states that
allowed branching, more developed transportation
technology led to greater geographical dispersion of
bank branches. We argued that transportation was
necessary for a dispersed strategy because of the
need for banks to (1) track the flow of funds be-
tween units, (2) monitor outlying locations, and (3)
maintain consistent standards across units. Before
the advent of modern information technology,
banks coordinated activities and monitored outly-
ing branches in two primary ways: (1) personnel
interaction between headquarters and outlying lo-
cations and (2) transfer of documents such as
checks, currency, account documents, and daily
reports of activities. Accomplishing these activi-
ties effectively required advanced transportation
technology.
Historical research recounts the system of travel-
ing agents that banks and other early service-ori-
ented firms used to monitor outlying locations
(Chandler, 1977). For example, as the history of
Comerica Bank records, “Auditors, known as the
‘eyes and ears of management,’ traveled to all loca-
tions to check accounts and records” (1999: 19–20).
Further, the historical record also illustrates that
“best practices” of branch management at the time
included frequent meetings between branch man-
agers and headquarters staff to maintain consis-
tency in culture and procedures. For example, as
one participant at a branch management seminar at
the 1924 AIB conference, the president of Dollar
Savings and Trust Company in Youngstown, Ohio,
described: “Our branch managers are asked to at-
tend a staff meeting at least twice a week. All of the
branch managers come into the main office on
Tuesday and Friday mornings” (AIB, 1924: 104).
These two features, travel by head office personnel
to the outlying locations and by branch managers to
headquarters, suggest that banks relied extensively
on the extant transportation infrastructure for suc-
cessful coordination among bank locations.
Second, banks used paper-intensive information
systems to conduct banking business in a dispersed
fashion and to keep headquarters abreast of local
branch operations. The use of internal communica-
tion processes as a control mechanism spread as
modernization advanced (Yates, 1989) and, in the
case of banks, the law often required physical trans-
fer of large volumes of paper documentation,
1450 DecemberAcademy of Management Journal
checks, and currency between headquarters and
local branches. Further, in a not uncommon prac-
tice, as noted above, Massachusetts required all
banks with branches to have duplicate books for
each branch at headquarters (AIB, 1923). Chapman
and Westerfield (1942), in a treatise on the manage-
ment of branch-banking organizations, described a
range of paper systems that were essential to the
conduct of bank branching. These included dupli-
cate records and daily reports as well as documen-
tation of personnel, financial statements, and gen-
eral business conditions, all of which had to be
physically transported from outlying locations to
headquarters. Furthermore, ease of “the transporta-
tion of funds” (i.e., currency itself, or bank drafts),
was one of the key features allowing a bank to grow
through branching (Chapman & Westerfield, 1942:
142). To accomplish the matching of loans and
deposits, banks had “transit departments,” which,
as described in a history of NationsBank, were “the
critical point in banking where what goes out is
reconciled with what comes in” (Covington & Ellis,
1993: 58).2
These historical accounts suggest that to super-
vise and coordinate geographically dispersed
branches poses significant challenges that might be
met by advances in transportation technology.
Banks could not expand geographically under a
restrictive state branching policy, yet when state-
wide branching was allowed, the existence of an
advanced transportation infrastructure in a state
enabled its banks to solve monitoring and coordi-
nation problems. As a result, these banks were
more likely to expand geographically and therefore
more likely to develop capabilities for managing
dispersed branches. According to the rationale de-
veloped above, such capabilities, which tend to
persist, were likely to provide contemporary stra-
tegic advantages for banks engaging in acquisitions
after deregulation began in 1978.
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of a less
restrictive founding branching policy on ac-
quisitions following deregulation is likely to
be stronger in states with more advanced
founding transportation infrastructure.
Urbanization at founding. Growth in industries
such as banking that provide services directly to
customers is greatly contingent on how customers
are distributed geographically. The level of urban-
ization in a state—the degree to which its popula-
tion is concentrated in cities—is therefore likely to
influence bank growth. A number of histories of the
early banking industry suggest that urbanization
processes in the 20th century directly led to banks’
growth via the advent of intracity branches (Collis,
1926; Fischer, 1968; Klebaner, 1990). The link be-
tween bank branching and increasing urbanization
is documented in a historical recounting of the
growth of Michigan-based Comerica Bank: “When
most Detroiters still lived around the downtown
area, one office served the bank well. As the pop-
ulation moved to the edges of the core city and
beyond, banks, like other retailers, had to follow if
they wished to remain competitive in serving cus-
tomers” (Comerica Bank, 1999: 31). However, the
strategies available to banks to keep up with the
expansion of cities differed, depending on the re-
strictiveness of state branching policy. For exam-
ple, since branching was permitted in Michigan,
banks simply established branches to serve increas-
ingly dispersed customers as Detroit expanded
(Southworth, 1928). But in Illinois, where branch-
ing was prohibited, more small independent banks
were founded to meet the needs of dispersed cus-
tomers as Chicago grew (Southworth, 1928). Thus,
banks founded in a state with high urbanization
were likely to establish intracity branches when
branching was allowed and, as a result, develop
branch coordination capabilities likely to provide
contemporary strategic advantages for banks pursu-
ing acquisitions after deregulation began.
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of a less re-
strictive founding branching policy on acquisi-
tions following deregulation is likely to be
stronger in states with greater founding
urbanization.
Founding Political Cultural Environment and
Resistance to Bank Geographical Expansion
Political culture, “the fundamental values, senti-
ments and knowledge that give form and substance
to political processes” (Pye, 1995: 965), is reflected
in social groups’ widely shared beliefs, attitudes,
and norms concerning the ways that political and
economic life ought to be carried out (Almond &
Verba, 1963; Wilson, 1992). Political culture is a
subjective orientation that is shaped by socializa-
2 For example, Harry Bishoff, manager of the transit
department for the First National Bank of St. Louis, de-
scribed how the transit department in a large bank is
essentially a network of paper flows, with the transit
department at the headquarters as the hub, coordinating
items such as “checks that originate in the morning
[mail]” to “letters coming from correspondents and con-
taining a large volume of checks payable outside St.
Louis” to payments routed to the Federal Reserve or the
many country banks that did not clear their checks
through the Federal Reserve (AIB, 1926: 223–238).
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tion processes and thus varies among the cultures
and subcultures in a larger political system (Ingle-
hart, 1990). The influence of political culture on
organizations is consequential yet underexplored
(Haveman et al., 2007; Scott & Davis, 2007; Stinch-
combe, 1968). To keep our discussion of political
culture and its implications manageable, we nar-
row our focus to elements of political culture that
would have had a direct influence on the geo-
graphic spread of banks during our study period.
Because business organizations have impinged
on almost all aspects of social life since industrial-
ization (Arrow, 1974; Davis & Marquis, 2005; Per-
row, 1991), they have often become the targets of
political and other movements that aim to promote
their beliefs (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005).
As Stinchcombe noted “Institutions and value pat-
terns are partly sustained because the population at
large believes in them” (1968: 112). To the extent
that followers of certain political beliefs constitute
important stakeholders (e.g., customers, creditors,
employees), organizations face pressure to conform
to these political beliefs in their business practices.
When practices of organizations contradict prevail-
ing political beliefs, resistance by the followers of
the beliefs often ensues (Almond & Verba, 1963).
This type of influence is of particular relevance for
understanding how political culture influenced
banking.
The particular political culture in the United
States that affected the geographical expansion of
banks is a longstanding set of suspicions about
large organizations (Marquis & Huang, 2009; Mar-
quis & Lounsbury, 2007; see also Dobbin, 1994;
Lipset, 1963; Mills, 1956). The origin of this set of
political beliefs can be traced back to the founding
of the United States and the debates between Jef-
ferson and Hamilton over the respective merits of
centralized and decentralized economic and polit-
ical structures. The Republicans, led by Thomas
Jefferson, preferred decentralized political and eco-
nomic systems with community-oriented control of
banks, and the major opposing party, the Federal-
ists, led by Alexander Hamilton, preferred central-
ized political and economic systems with large,
multiple-branch, national banks (Hammond, 1957).
Prior research has identified two distinct manifes-
tations of the former set of deep-seated political
beliefs, local agrarianism and Progressivism, that
constrained and resisted banks’ geographical ex-
pansion (Mahoney, 2001). In addressing local
agrarianism, we focus on both organized resistance
mobilized by social movement organizations and
resistance by individual agrarian actors. In consid-
ering Progressivism, we focus on popular opinion
in the form of votes garnered in elections by Pro-
gressive candidates.
Agrarian resistance at founding. For much of
U.S. history, local agrarianism was a particularly
important political logic that promoted communi-
ty-oriented banking and resisted bank branching
(Calomiris, 2000; Mahoney, 2001; Marquis &
Huang, 2009; Roe, 1994). For example, Roe (1994)
described how farmers and small-town residents
fervently supported local banking because locally
focused banks would presumably continue supply-
ing credit during economic downturns. Calomiris
(2000) similarly documented that farmers have val-
ued local banking throughout U.S. history up to the
present and that this cultural support was essential
to maintaining a decentralized banking system.
Banks that expanded into different geographical
areas were likely to be perceived as powerful cor-
porations that lacked local orientation and for
which outside interests were therefore likely to
trump local interests. As a result, agrarian actors
were likely to resist geographical expansion by
banks. This resistance became particularly salient
when a state’s branching policy allowed geograph-
ical expansion (Marquis & Huang, 2009). We sug-
gest that the resistance of local agrarianism to large
and geographically dispersed banks has implica-
tions for whether or not banks pursued a dispersed
strategy and therefore developed coordination ca-
pabilities at the time of their founding.
Local agrarianism resisted banks’ geographic ex-
pansion through both organized social movements
and unorganized efforts by individuals. The ex-
pression of political beliefs through social move-
ments is now a well established theme in organiza-
tional theory (Davis et al., 2005; Haveman et al.,
2007; Schneiberg et al., 2008). Particularly relevant
for our focus on resistance to large corporations is
the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry
(the Grange), an agrarian activist organization
founded in the mid 19th century to promote the
practices and values of farmers through locally af-
filiated “granges” in different states (Buck, 1963;
Gardner, 1949; Nordin, 1974; Robinson, 1966). One
of the Grange’s activities was to resist large-scale
commercial banks because the latter did not sup-
port farmers’ interests—for example, they charged
exorbitant interest rates for loans to farmers (Rob-
inson, 1966). Large and impersonal banks without
strong local attachments were considered as less
sympathetic to farmers. As Howard documented,
“[the] Grange viewed their local banks as commu-
nity institutions, sympathetic with their credit
needs. Large banking interests, they feared, would
drain local money to the large cities, making it
unavailable to farmers” (1992: 137). The Grange
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resisted the intrusion of large banks into local com-
munities by establishing their own banks or coop-
eratives as alternatives to commercial banks (Buck,
1963; Robinson, 1966). These resistance efforts
reflected the Grange’s general approach of estab-
lishing cooperative and mutual organizations in
different industries, as alternatives to corporate
capitalism (Schneiberg et al., 2008).
The views of these activists and organized farm-
ers would no doubt be well known to banks and
bankers, because not only did their activities and
positions garner significant press coverage (e.g.,
New York Times, 1889), but also, in fact, many
community bankers were members of the Grange
and attended their regular meetings (Harshaw,
1925), viewing the organization as an ideal market-
ing channel and way to get to know possible clients
(Brockman, 1956). We suggest that in states where
branching policy encouraged newly founded banks
to pursue geographical expansion, greater Grange
presence might function as a counterforce to expan-
sion strategies because of the organization’s resis-
tance to branch banking and the close connection
between bankers and Grange-oriented farmers.
Given that such locally oriented banks had little
need to manage dispersed branches, they were less
likely to develop the coordination capabilities that
would be needed to pursue an acquisition strategy
after 1978.
Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of a less re-
strictive founding branching policy on acquisi-
tions following deregulation is likely to be
weaker in states with a greater founding
presence of agrarian social movement
organizations.
Besides the Grange movement, a greater presence
of actors with agrarian beliefs might also constrain
the geographical expansion of large banks and fos-
ter locally oriented banks, as historical evidence
suggests that the process of lending to farmers en-
couraged banks to be locally oriented. First, agri-
cultural lending was a specialized business that
required significant interaction between bankers
and farmers.3 Although other types of bank lending
are based either on characteristics of the borrower
or secured by a hard asset, the key to agricultural
lending is “crop risk,” which requires knowledge of
items such as local soil and land conditions (Har-
shaw, 1925). Loans to farmers were usually short
term, spanning the planting season fromMarch 1 of
a current year to March 1 of the next year and
requiring frequent interaction between farmer and
banker (Brannan, 1926; Clingerman, 1989). Bankers
thus in many cases came to be seen as the essential
“go between for the people of the (agrarian) com-
munity” (Laughlin, 1920: 624). Another common
practice among banks at the time, as reported by the
cashier of the Grove City National Bank of Grove
City, Pennsylvania, was conducting agricultural
surveys for the purpose of establishing agricultural
development programs for banks’ catchment areas
(Harshaw, 1925). Banks typically hired individuals
for their agricultural department who had a farm
background, and these individuals were frequently
involved in day-to-day farming operations of cli-
ents, from fixing windmills to helping with the
harvest, as described in a memoir by Clingerman
(1989), a manager of a bank farm department in
1940s Nebraska. Further, farmers were also fre-
quently involved in the governance of banks in
agrarian areas; research suggests banks had farmers
on their boards as a means of gathering local infor-
mation and attracting clients (Mizruchi, 1996). As
described by the president of the American Na-
tional Bank, Richmond, Virginia, in regard to banks
in the South, “Many bank officers and directors are
farmers themselves, and this is not confined to the
small town bank, for many of those actively con-
nected with the larger institutions are either farm-
ers or have for some period of their lives had expe-
rience which enables them to appreciate many of
the problems confronting agriculture” (Sands,
1920: 743).
This need for close relationships as a prerequisite
for doing business with farmers constrained banks’
geographical expansion, which necessarily re-
sulted in their being less locally focused and less
able to serve farmers with idiosyncratic demands.
Banks that expand geographically try to standard-
ize across branchesusing a set ofwell-definedopera-
tional routines and procedures to achieve cost effi-
ciency. This practice is dubbed “replication” or the
3 This is indicated by a considerable number of publi-
cations devoted to “banker-farmer” relations. For exam-
ple, the agricultural section of the American Bankers
Association published Banker-Farmer beginning in 1913
(Bankers Magazine, 1915). Farm Credit Leader was pub-
lished by the Farm Credit Administration of Omaha four
to six times a year between January 1944 and December
1973. One of the authors examined all issues of Farm
Credit Leader. The motto of this publication was “dedi-
cated for the constructive leadership in the field of credit
for farmers and ranchers in Iowa, Nebraska, South Da-
kota, and Wyoming.” Typical stories in the Farm Credit
Leader include reports of loan activities across the states,
stories about which banks led the lending for the period,
information on the fees of various banks, the importance
of record keeping for farming, how farmers could im-
prove their credit standing, and interest rate trends.
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“McDonald’s approach” (Szulanski, 2000; Winter &
Szulanski, 2001). As a result, it is difficult for large
banks to develop the kind of close relationships
that farmers expect to have with banks and that
local community banks provide to farmers. Thus,
large banks were readily characterized as imper-
sonal and indifferent to local and farmers’ interests,
leading to deep-seated distrust of large banks by
farmers (Calomiris, 2000; Marquis & Huang, 2009;
Roe, 1994). By contrast, as noted, local community
banks devoted enormous efforts to cultivating close
relationships with farmers, which not only helped
farmers get highly customized services and favor-
able interest rates, but also, probably more impor-
tantly, ensured farmers that banks would continue
to lend to them during bad seasons (Roe, 1994).
Farmers might therefore use local banks and pub-
licly voice their negative opinions about banks en-
gaged in branching (see Marquis and Lounsbury
[2007] for an account of another, similar, type of
resistance). Such resistance may render geographic
expansion a less attractive growth strategy, espe-
cially when the resistance is strong.
In sum, even when a state’s branching policy
encouraged newly founded banks to pursue geo-
graphical expansion, the strong presence of local
agrarian actors in that state might function as a
counterforce. Farmers might resist patronizing
large banks, and bank founders likely shared the
agrarian political cultural beliefs and so tended to
found banks that were locally oriented and less
likely to expand their geographical scope, even if
branching were allowed. Given that locally ori-
ented banks had little need to manage dispersed
branches, they were less likely to develop the co-
ordination capabilities that would be needed to
pursue an acquisition strategy after 1978.
Hypothesis 5. The positive effect of a less re-
strictive founding branching policy on acquisi-
tions following deregulation is likely to be
weaker in states with a greater founding pres-
ence of agrarian actors.
Progressive presence at founding. Progressiv-
ism was a “political movement that addressed
ideas, impulses, and issues stemming from mod-
ernization of American society” and differed from
the above-mentioned agrarianism in that it was
more focused on cities (Harriby, 1999: 41; Wiebe,
1967). Although often labeled a “movement,” Pro-
gressivism was not tightly organized in the tradi-
tional sense of social movements, but was rather a
general spirit of reform as a reaction to the vast
social and economic changes brought about by in-
dustrialization in the early part of the 20th century
(Haveman et al., 2007; Tindall & Shi, 1999). But
lack of organization does not mean that Progressiv-
ism did not impact the American society. Rather,
Progressivism “established much of the tone of
American politics throughout the first half of the
century” (Harriby, 1999: 41) and was a “powerful
wind that blew across the political-cultural land-
scape” (Haveman et al., 2007: 125). As a whole,
Progressives advocated and promoted a wide-rang-
ing agenda in areas such as democracy, efficiency,
regulation of large corporations, and social justice
(McCormick, 1981; Rodgers, 1982).
One particular issue concerning Progressives,
consistent with their general advocacy of the dis-
persion of power, was the increasing power of large
corporations that resulted from industrialization
(McCormick, 1981; Rodgers, 1982; Roe, 1994). Pro-
gressives’ protests against large corporations, both
in the streets and in elections, were abundant. For
example, before 1906, the Southern Pacific Rail-
road “was the largest land owner, the biggest em-
ployer, and the richest enterprise” in California,
and even the state government “was subservient to”
its interests (Haveman et al., 2007: 124). The un-
trammeled power of the Southern Pacific Railroad
invited vehement protests by Progressives after
1906 and was subsequently undermined after Pro-
gressive activists mounted a successful candidate
in the 1910 gubernatorial election that defeated the
Southern Pacific’s candidates.
Large banks and financial interests were a partic-
ularly visible target for Progressive reform. One of
the key documents of the Progressive era, Louis
Brandeis’s (1914) Other People’s Money, and How
the Bankers Use It, details extensive moral outrage
at the concentration of power in large banks and
bankers as a result of industrialization and the need
for the population to resist this process. For exam-
ple, in various states Progressives pushed for the
passage of “blue-sky” laws, which benefited small
rather than large banks by restricting the sale of
securities. Mahoney (2001), for example, showed
that Progressive political coalitions strongly influ-
enced the rapidity with which a state adopted a
blue-sky law, building on prior historical research
that documents the Progressive mobilization in
many U.S. states for restricting the growth of finan-
cial interests (Macey & Miller, 1991; Roe, 1994).
Given Progressives’ general distaste for large and
powerful financial interests, the greater presence of
Progressives in a state was more likely to constrain
the geographical expansion of banks through
branching to the extent that geographical expan-
sion inevitably increased banks’ market size and
thus power to influence markets. As a result, even
if a state allowed branching, newly founded banks
were less likely to engage in geographical expan-
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sion through branching if the state had a greater
presence of Progressives. On the one hand, Progres-
sives in a state tended to resist geographical expan-
sion that created large banks. On the other, their
greater presence in a state also increased the like-
lihood that founders of banks might share Progres-
sive ideologies and thus establish banks focused on
serving local communities. Either way, the pres-
ence of Progressives would attenuate the effect of
branching law in stimulating banks to expand geo-
graphically. As a result, banks founded in states
with a greater presence of Progressives were less
likely to develop capabilities for managing dis-
persed units, capabilities that were instrumental
for engaging in acquisition as a growth strategy
after the 1978 deregulation.
Hypothesis 6. The positive effect of a less re-
strictive founding branching policy on acquisi-
tions following deregulation is likely to be
weaker in states with a greater founding pres-
ence of Progressive political support.
METHODS AND ANALYSES
Sample and Units of Analysis
To test the foregoing hypotheses regarding the
imprinting of founding institutional environments,
we focused on all U.S. commercial banks that ex-
isted between 1978 and 2001 in the 48 contiguous
U.S. states. Using annual end-of-year Commercial
Bank and Bank Holding Company files (Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2004), we constructed a
database of more than 220,000 observations corre-
sponding to the approximately 25,000 banks that
existed during this period. Owing to missing obser-
vations for some financial variables, we tested our
predictions on a data set that includes 201,868
observations.4 We defined banks at the highest
level of ownership (i.e., all subsidiaries were in-
cluded in one observation that corresponds to the
bank designated the primary bank), presuming de-
cision-making authority regarding major strategies
such as acquisitions to reside at that level (Zollo &
Singh, 2004).
Dependent Variable
Bank acquisition. Bank acquisition was mea-
sured by a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating
that a bank acquired another bank in a given year
and 0 otherwise. Alternative approaches might use
a count of a bank’s acquisitions in a given year. We
chose to dichotomize this variable and use logistic
regression analysis for several reasons. First, our
theory and hypotheses relate to the propensity to
engage in acquisition, rather than its frequency, in
a given year. Second, more than 80 percent of the
bank-year observations that were greater than 0
were 1. Finally, we were more confident about data
quality and completeness using a dichotomous
variable. Many acquisitions of what were single
firms according to our definition of highest-level
ownership were coded in these databases as multi-
ple acquisitions if more than one subsidiary was
acquired (i.e., if a large bank comprising a number
of separate legal entities was acquired, the database
reflects the total number of entities acquired).
Therefore, by coding our dependent variable in this
way, we avoided any potential biases from single
acquisitions being counted multiple times.
Independent Variables
Founding legal environment. Annual, state-
level histories of the legal environments of all 48
states in the sample from 1896 to 2001 were created
using the procedures described in Marquis and
Huang (2009). To develop these regulatory histo-
ries, we examined more than 15 secondary sources
as well as, in many cases, actual state statutes.
Regulations were divided into three categories: full
statewide banking (i.e., no geographic restrictions
on locations); unit banking (banks limited to one
location); and limited statewide banking (branch-
ing permitted, but restricted in some way). Found-
ing branching policy was a dummy variable with 1
designating full statewide banking and 0 otherwise.
This measurement strategy was appropriate be-
cause limited statewide banking was typically
quite restricted. Branching was sometimes limited
by geography (e.g., within the county or city in
which a bank was headquartered), sometimes by
number (e.g., only one or two branches permitted),
and sometimes by an even more narrow criterion
(e.g., permitted only within sight of the
headquarters).5
4 Most of the missing observations were organizations
that existed for only one year. Because we used lagged
variables, these firms fell of out the analysis, there being
no prior-year values. The results were similar when we
used contemporaneous values that enabled us to include
the firms that existed for only one year.
5 Running the models with a dichotomous dependent
variable that reflected whether branching in any form
was permitted (i.e., limited and statewide were one cat-
egory) yielded similar results, albeit in some instances
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Founding modernization processes. This study
focuses on two particular manifestations of mod-
ernization processes: development of transporta-
tion technology and urbanization. To test Hypoth-
esis 2, regarding the moderating effect of founding
transportation infrastructure, we created a measure
of transportation infrastructure for each state-year
that reflected the growth of U.S. roadways.6 One
possibility was to operationalize this as total mile-
age, but we were unable to locate the complete data
for the target historical period. We identified two
alternative operationalizations for which we were
able to locate the requisite data for almost the entire
period: annual state-level capital spending on road-
ways and annual state-level highway maintenance.
These data were culled from Highway Statistics, an
annual publication of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, for the appropriate years. Capital
spending on roadways should reflect the expansion
of highways, and the level of highway maintenance
should be a direct function of the extent of road-
ways. These measures have the additional benefit
of likely capturing quality of roads, which would
significantly affect transportation capability. More-
over, they reflect characteristics such as road width
and number of lanes that a simple measure of mile-
age would not capture.7
At the national level, since the data became avail-
able in 1921, both measures correlate at .95 with
total highway mileage. Because these data extend
back only to 1921, to be able to use the full range of
observations of our other independent variables we
extrapolated back from 1921 to 1896.8 Because
highway maintenance and highway capital expen-
ditures were correlated at .97 and both returned
similar results in the analyses, we created a princi-
pal component factor score of the extent of highway
development for each state-year. To test Hypothesis
3, we measured founding urbanization as the per-
centage of the state population that lived in urban-
ized areas in a given year. The requisite data were
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau at ten-year
intervals beginning in 1890, with intervening years
being linearly interpolated.
Founding political cultural environment. This
study focused on two distinct manifestations of
political culture: local agrarianism and Progressiv-
ism. For local agrarianism, we examined both so-
cial movements mobilized by the Grange and the
presence of agrarian actors. To test Hypothesis 4,
we constructed a variable, founding Grange mem-
bership, measured as the number of national
Grange family members per state at the founding of
a bank. Following Schneiberg et al. (2008), we used
data from Tontz (1964). This data source presents
Grange membership at 12 points in time between
1875 and 1960 but does not contain later data. We
linearly interpolated intervening years. Extensive
search and discussions with the National Grange
headquarters in Washington, DC, did not lead to
our finding state-level data for after 1960. Because
our key theoretical point regards the political activ-
ism of the Grange, and historical evidence suggests
less significant than the reported results. Because, as
noted, limited branching was frequently highly restricted
(e.g., permitted only within sight of the headquarters), it
is unlikely that banks in those states would develop the
same coordination capability that those in statewide-
banking states developed, so any reduction in signifi-
cance is not surprising.
6 Although other communication and transportation
technologies played a role, significant historical evi-
dence indicates that the development of roadways was
the most important. Even when there was communica-
tion between a bank and branch via telephone, for exam-
ple, transactions had to be physically recorded on a pa-
per “ticket” that was physically transported to the central
office (AIB, 1923).
7 One reviewer questioned the extent to which one can
consider increases in transportation infrastructure to be a
continuous process whereby “all variance matters” or
whether the effects of advances in roadways on our the-
orized process would be best considered a “threshold”
process (i.e., very little marginal effect once a certain
level is reached). We believe that our continuous mea-
sure is most appropriate for two reasons. First, there were
a number of significant technical advances throughout
our historical period that resulted in expanded travel
ability—for example, the transition from dirt country
roads to paved roads, and an increase in the number of
lanes on highways, accommodating more drivers. Sec-
ond, throughout the period, highways continued to ex-
pand to new areas, giving access to new populations.
Clearly there may have been some diminishing returns
over time, although these were mainly after 1978.
8 To accomplish this for both variables, we multiplied
the percent of overall highway expenditures in 1921 by
the percent change in total national highway mileage
(data for which exist back to 1900). For example, in 1921,
national maintenance expenditures totaled $65,000 (11
states had $0 and 20 states had less than $200). New
York’s $9,000 represented 14 percent of the total. Na-
tional mileage that year increased by 15 percent (to
55,000 miles), so for New York, for example, we sub-
tracted 15 percent from $9,000 to get approximately
$7,500. By 1900, the end of this data series, total national
mileage was reduced to 100. To get values for 1896 to
1899, we linearly interpolated for each state under the
assumption that in 1896 there were 0 miles. Inasmuch as
the highway system did not grow significantly until after
1921, the extrapolation and interpolation of these values
should not have biased the analyses.
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that Grange activism and memberships in the
Grange substantially declined in after 1960
(Howard, 1992), we treated banks that were
founded after 1960 as if there were no Grange pres-
ence at founding. We also ran analyses with only
banks founded before 1960, and the results were
similar to what we report here.
To test Hypothesis 5, we created the variable
founding agrarian presence, measured as the num-
ber of farms in a given state compared to the overall
population (i.e., farmers per capita). As argued
above, the presence of agrarian actors affected the
founding of banks through (1) individual consum-
ers’ resistance and (2) the founders of banks by
providing templates of organization. Both effects
depended on the number of actors that held agrar-
ian beliefs. The data for this measure, collected
from the USDA National Agriculture Statistics Ser-
vice, cover 1890 to the present (USDA, 2004). As
for other variables, we assigned firms founded prior
to the start of this data series the value at the start of
the series.
To test Hypothesis 6, we constructed founding
Progressive presence, measured as the political
support garnered by Progressive political candi-
dates (i.e., any party that had the word “Progres-
sive” in its name) in elections for national offices
(president, senator, representative) in each state at
the founding of a bank. These data were obtained
from Interuniversity Consortium for Political and
Social Research study 7757 (ICPSR, 1994). Elec-
tions occur every two years, and the intervening
year were interpolated. Although it would have
been ideal to also have election data for state-level
offices, to the best of our knowledge, such data do
not exist in a systematic fashion for the historical
period of this study.
Control Variables
We included control variables measured at both
organizational and state levels to account for pos-
sible alternative explanations to our arguments and
for factors found to affect acquisitions in previous
studies (e.g., Davis & Stout, 1992; Palmer, Barber,
Zhou, & Soysol, 1995; Stearns & Allan, 1996).
At the organizational level, the two most impor-
tant controls related to bank acquisitions are per-
formance and size. Bank performance was assessed
relatively, as income compared to size—that is, in-
come/assets (Stiroh & Poole, 2000)—and bank size
was operationalized as total bank assets. Values for
these financial variables were taken from the data-
bases referenced above and lagged one year. Con-
trolling for these two variables helped us to address
one important alternative explanation: that banks
founded in a state allowing statewide branching are
likely to engage subsequently in acquisitions, not
because of their capabilities for managing multiple
units, but because of their performance and size, to
the extent that banks allowed to branch out from
the time of their founding were more likely to grow
larger or perform better than other banks. To ac-
count for the possibility of banks learning the co-
ordination capabilities we discussed, we included
years under statewide banking (the number of years
a bank operated under statewide-banking laws), as-
suming that banks were more likely to learn such
capabilities when exposed to such an environment
longer. To account for experience in acquisitions
(Zollo & Singh, 2004), we included a dummy vari-
able, previous acquisition, with 1 indicating that a
bank had previously acquired another bank and 0
otherwise. We also included headquarters in MSA,
indicating that a bank’s headquarters was in an
urban area (a metropolitan statistical area, or MSA);
bank age, measured as the number of years since a
bank’s founding (log-transformed as extreme values
existed); and multibank holding company, a
dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the bank
was organized as a multibank holding company
and 0 otherwise. Finally, to account for New York’s
unique early banking history and for its being the
financial center of the U.S., we included a dummy
variable, early New York bank, with 1 indicating a
New York bank founded prior to 1900.
In studies of imprinting, it is also important to
include controls for contemporary environmental
effects (Meyer & Brown, 1977), so we accounted for
economic and policy characteristics of a bank’s
home state. Reflecting the state policy environ-
ment, we included variables indicating whether or
not a state had branching law and further, whether
or not it allowed interstate banking, both laws be-
ing intended to promote acquisitions (Stiroh & Stra-
han, 2003). We also included a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the state was a statewide-
banking state in 1978 (statewide banking in 1978),
the year in which the shift to the national environ-
ment began; such major environmental shifts have
been theorized to impact imprinting processes
(Stinchcombe, 1965), and banks that were state-
wide prior to deregulation might have been at an
advantage in the expanded setting. Contemporary
state-level economic conditions measured here
were per capita income and urbanization, calcu-
lated using the same sources and methods de-
scribed above. To control for the contemporary ef-
fect of agrarian presence, we also included a
contemporaneous measure of farm presence in a
state, operationalized as the average size of farms in
a state. Because of the comparatively recent devel-
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opment of industrial agriculture and consolidation
of farmland, we feel this is a better contemporane-
ous measure of farm presence than the number of
farmers. We also included the square miles of a
state to account for spatial differences that may
affect transportation infrastructure. Moreover, to
the extent that larger states might have higher with-
in-state variation, controlling for this variable helps
us partly address the possible concern that our
measures of founding conditions at the state level
are insensitive to the within-state variation of these
founding conditions. To account for the banking
markets in each state, we controlled for the number
of banks per capita (capturing contemporaneous
competition among banks) and average bank size,
both of which were calculated from U.S. Census
population figures, data from apposite years of the
FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking series
(http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp), and an
ICPSR file (Flood, 1998). To account for acquisition
waves (Stearns & Allan, 1996), we also included a
count of the number of acquisitions in the bank’s
headquarters state in the previous year. In addition
to our theorized founding environments, we further
included a variable capturing the competition at
founding, the number of banks present in a state, a
density measure frequently used by ecological
studies of imprinting (see, e.g., Carroll & Hannan,
2000).
Statistical Models
Since we were concerned with whether or not a
bank engaged in acquisitions, the dependent vari-
able, acquisition, was binary, with 1 indicating that
a bank acquired another bank in a given year. More-
over, since we observed banks repeatedly during
the study period, we had a cross-sectional time
series panel in which observations were unlikely to
be completely independent. Given these character-
istics of our data, we conducted the analyses using
the “xtlogit” command in STATAwith the random-
effects option. Although both fixed-effects and ran-
dom-effects options are available, testing the effects
of the time-invariant founding environments ren-
dered fixed-effects specification impossible. We
nevertheless included year dummy variables to
control for any unobserved time effects.9
RESULTS
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and
correlations for the variables included in our anal-
yses. Owing to some high correlations between
some of our variables, we took a number of steps to
ensure that our estimates were not biased by mul-
ticollinearity. First, since testing the hypotheses
required the inclusion of interaction terms, we
mean-centered the theorized variables before creat-
ing the interaction terms. We also conducted vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) tests for all of our mod-
els. The only model that had any VIF scores of over
ten, the recommended threshold value (Gujarati,
2003), was the full model, model 10, which should
be interpreted with more caution than the others.
Table 3 presents the results of our analyses.
Model 1 includes control variables at both organi-
zational and state levels, and model 2 adds the
main effects of the founding conditions with the
exception of founding branching policy. Model 3
tests Hypothesis 1 regarding the main effect of
founding branching policy. Models 4 and 5 exam-
ine the effect of modernization processes by adding
the interaction of founding branching policy with
founding transportation infrastructure and urban-
ization. Models 6 to 9 investigate the effect of
founding political culture by adding the interaction
of founding branching policy with founding Grange
membership, agrarian presence, and Progressive
presence. Model 10 is the complete model with all
variables.
Several features of the control model, model 1,
are worth noting. First, both bank performance and
size are significant predictors of banks’ propensity
to engage in acquisitions. As would be expected,
larger banks are more likely to make acquisitions.
However, it is banks with lower performance that
are more likely to acquire other firms. Although
this finding may seem surprising, it is consistent
with extensive research that has shown that bank
9 One reviewer questioned the extent to which these
laws were exogenous when one is considering future
acquisitions of newly founded banks, because banks that
were interested in growing may have lobbied to change
branching policies. We feel that our findings are robust to
these endogeneity concerns for a number of reasons.
First, because we looked at banks’ founding environ-
ments, for there to be bias, the bank founders would have
had to lobby for legal changes many years in advance of
their bank’s founding. Regulatory approvals cause a one-
to two-year lag in setting up a bank, and legal struggles
are typically protracted. We believe that it is unlikely
that future bank founders would work so far in advance
to shape their environment. Also, historical work (Calo-
miris, 2000) suggests that newly founded smaller banks
were, if anything, more likely to lobby for more restric-
tive laws. Finally, in our prior work (Marquis & Huang,
2009), we showed through a two-stage instrumental vari-
able approach that branching laws tended to encourage
banks to pursue branching regardless of their intention to
lobby or not.
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TABLE 3
Results of Random-Effects Logistic Regression Analyses of Bank Acquisitions, 1978–2001a
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Founding conditions
H1: Branching policy 0.360*
(0.096)
0.234**
(0.102)
0.316*
(0.098)
H2: Branching policy  transportation 0.297*
(0.065)
H3: Branching policy  urbanization 0.911*
(0.278)
H4: Branching policy  Grange membership
H5: Branching policy  agrarian presence
H6: Branching policy  Progressive presence
Transportation infrastructure 0.063
(0.055)
0.064
(0.055)
0.084
(0.055)
0.052
(0.055)
Urbanization 0.220
(0.375)
0.558
(0.388)
0.483
(0.391)
0.215
(0.405)
Grange membership 0.006
(0.053)
0.005
(0.011)
0.001
(0.011)
0.004
(0.011)
Agrarian presence 0.010
(0.011)
1.344
(1.077)
0.595
(1.104)
0.632
(1.122)
Progressive presence 1.027
(1.062)
0.160
(0.510)
0.278
(0.512)
0.289
(0.514)
Organizational controls
Income/assets, t 1 4.289*
(1.653)
3.958**
(1.805)
4.167**
(1.817)
4.144**
(1.819)
4.239**
(1.822)
Bank total assets, t 1 0.734*
(0.021)
0.747*
(0.024)
0.751*
(0.024)
0.759*
(0.024)
0.758*
(0.024)
Headquarters in MSA 0.077
(0.060)
0.045
(0.066)
0.050
(0.066)
0.053
(0.066)
0.054
(0.066)
Bank ageb 0.031
(0.040)
0.208**
(0.101)
0.073
(0.107)
0.030
(0.110)
0.042
(0.108)
Multibank holding company 0.862*
(0.065)
0.860*
(0.072)
0.863*
(0.072)
0.867*
(0.072)
0.869*
(0.072)
Previous acquisitions 0.620*
(0.075)
0.600*
(0.088)
0.593*
(0.088)
0.571*
(0.088)
0.572*
(0.088)
Early New York bank 0.088
(0.214)
0.181
(0.486)
0.196
(0.486)
0.251
(0.488)
0.264
(0.488)
Environmental controls
Years under statewide banking 0.001
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.004†
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
State branching policy 0.212*
(0.073)
0.271*
(0.082)
0.271*
(0.081)
0.227*
(0.082)
0.249*
(0.082)
Interstate banking law 0.233**
(0.094)
0.257**
(0.106)
0.254**
(0.106)
0.244**
(0.106)
0.234**
(0.106)
State per capita income 0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
State urbanization 0.004
(0.331)
0.763
(0.512)
0.562
(0.518)
0.522
(0.516)
0.491
(0.518)
Founding bank density 0.070
(0.056)
0.136†
(0.071)
0.070
(0.056)
0.056
(0.056)
0.084
(0.056)
Number of banks, t 1 0.077†
(0.045)
0.362*
(0.054)
0.115
(0.071)
0.207*
(0.075)
0.144**
(0.072)
Average bank size, t 1 0.225*
(0.038)
0.017*
(0.002)
0.388*
(0.054)
0.418*
(0.055)
0.393*
(0.054)
Number of acquisitions, t 1 0.018*
(0.002)
0.004
(0.007)
0.017*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
State square miles 0.005
(0.007)
0.692**
(0.338)
0.005
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
0.000
(0.007)
Statewide banking in 1978 0.654**
(0.290)
0.136**
(0.061)
0.656†
(0.338)
0.670**
(0.337)
0.665**
(0.338)
State average farm size 0.109†
(0.062)
7.96*
(1.074)
0.109†
(0.062)
0.125**
(0.062)
0.114†
(0.062)
Constant 9.229*
(0.608)
0.271*
(0.082)
7.975*
(1.076)
8.316*
(1.080)
6.431*
(1.150)
Observations 221,923 201,868 201,868 201,868 201,868
Number of groups (banks) 24,712 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989
Log-likelihood 11,132.2 9,499.8 9,492.8 9,482.0 9,487.3
a Acquisition  1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b Logarithm.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
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TABLE 3
Continued
Variable 6 7 8 9 10
Founding conditions
H1: Branching policy 0.248**
(0.102)
0.320*
(0.099)
0.341*
(0.096)
0.230**
(0.103)
0.179†
(0.106)
H2: Branching policy  transportation 0.354*
(0.111)
H3: Branching policy  urbanization 0.958
(0.656)
H4: Branching policy  Grange membership 0.074*
(0.021)
0.062*
(0.023)
0.048**
(0.023)
H5: Branching policy  agrarian presence 3.621**
(1.553)
1.968
(1.638)
9.077**
(3.667)
H6: Branching policy  Progressive presence 2.257†
(1.255)
1.693
(1.260)
1.043
(1.280)
Transportation infrastructure 0.043
(0.055)
0.059
(0.055)
0.064
(0.055)
0.043
(0.055)
0.071
(0.057)
Urbanization 0.647†
(0.389)
0.483
(0.390)
0.565
(0.387)
0.593
(0.391)
0.328
(0.438)
Grange membership 0.017
(0.011)
0.004
(0.011)
0.004
(0.011)
0.014
(0.011)
0.011
(0.012)
Agrarian presence 1.385
(1.080)
1.284
(1.076)
1.319
(1.080)
1.321
(1.081)
0.175
(1.224)
Progressive presence 0.187
(0.509)
0.248
(0.512)
0.289
(0.556)
0.106
(0.561)
0.022
(0.565)
Organizational controls
Income/assets, t 1 4.196**
(1.817)
4.178**
(1.819)
4.225**
(1.818)
4.242**
(1.819)
4.236**
(1.821)
Bank total assets, t 1 0.753*
(0.024)
0.755*
(0.024)
0.752*
(0.024)
0.756*
(0.024)
0.760*
(0.024)
Headquarters in MSA 0.049
(0.066)
0.052
(0.066)
0.046
(0.066)
0.047
(0.066)
0.049
(0.066)
Bank ageb 0.021
(0.108)
0.032
(0.109)
0.070
(0.107)
0.004
(0.109)
0.016
(0.111)
Multibank holding company 0.864*
(0.072)
0.866*
(0.072)
0.862*
(0.072)
0.864*
(0.072)
0.866*
(0.072)
Previous acquisitions 0.589*
(0.087)
0.582*
(0.088)
0.595*
(0.087)
0.587*
(0.087)
0.572*
(0.088)
Early New York bank 0.242
(0.486)
0.224
(0.487)
0.196
(0.486)
0.250
(0.486)
0.295
(0.488)
Environmental controls
Years under statewide banking 0.003
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.004
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.003)
State branching policy 0.265*
(0.081)
0.251*
(0.082)
0.267*
(0.081)
0.252*
(0.082)
0.237*
(0.082)
Interstate banking law 0.256**
(0.105)
0.246**
(0.106)
0.256**
(0.106)
0.252**
(0.106)
0.243**
(0.106)
State per capita income 0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
State urbanization 0.449
(0.517)
0.475
(0.519)
0.556
(0.517)
0.418
(0.517)
0.599
(0.518)
Founding bank density 0.050
(0.056)
0.083
(0.056)
0.074
(0.056)
0.063
(0.057)
0.023
(0.058)
Number of banks, t 1 0.175**
(0.073)
0.135†
(0.072)
0.122†
(0.071)
0.182**
(0.073)
0.245**
(0.076)
Average bank size, t 1 0.411*
(0.055)
0.391*
(0.054)
0.384*
(0.054)
0.406*
(0.055)
0.433*
(0.055)
Number of acquisitions, t 1 0.017*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
0.017*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
State square miles 0.005
(0.007)
0.003
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.003
(0.007)
0.000
(0.007)
Statewide banking in 1978 0.667**
(0.337)
0.660†
(0.338)
0.661†
(0.337)
0.671**
(0.337)
0.679**
(0.337)
State average farm size 0.126**
(0.062)
0.110†
(0.062)
0.108†
(0.062)
0.123**
(0.062)
0.140**
(0.062)
Constant 7.948*
(1.071)
8.156*
(1.080)
8.094*
(1.076)
8.141*
(1.077)
8.175*
(1.079)
Observations 201,868 201,868 201,868 201,868 201,868
Number of groups (banks) 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989
Log-likelihood 9,486.7 9,490.0 9,491.1 9,484.9 9,476.4
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acquisitions have a negative impact on perfor-
mance (Rhoades, 1994). It is particularly interesting
to contrast the findings for years under statewide
banking and statewide banking in 1978. First, du-
ration under statewide banking had no effect on
acquisitions. This suggests that the alternative
learning hypothesis—that banks are able to develop
capabilities the longer they are exposed to an envi-
ronment that allows branching—does not hold in
this domain. However, being in a statewide-bank-
ing state in 1978 does appear to have had an im-
portant positive effect, suggesting that those firms
that were in the most liberal environment at the
beginning of deregulation were especially well
poised to acquire other firms in the new environ-
ment. A number of other controls suggested by
previous research on acquisitions were also signif-
icant, corroborating previous studies.
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 1 regarding the positive
effect of being founded in a statewide-banking state
on subsequent acquisitions. The estimated coeffi-
cient for founding branching policy is statistically
significant with the predicted positive sign, sup-
porting Hypothesis 1. According to the estimated
equation in model 3 (exp[0.360 founding branch-
ing law]), all else being equal, banks founded in a
state allowing statewide branching were over 43
percent more likely to subsequently engage in ac-
quisitions than other banks. It is noteworthy that
we observed the effects of founding branching law
even after controlling for banks’ financial and
structural characteristics, learning processes, and
contemporary environmental conditions, the major
alternative explanations. Coupled with the histori-
cal evidence discussed above, this link between
founding branching policy and banks’ tendency to
acquire other banks, as shown in model 3, supports
our arguments regarding how banks developed ca-
pabilities for managing dispersed units.
Models 4 and 5 further support the idea that
banks’ capabilities are the mechanism linking
founding branching policy to their subsequent ten-
dency to acquire other banks. Model 4 tests Hy-
pothesis 2 regarding the moderating effect of found-
ing transportation infrastructure in a state. The
estimated coefficient for the interaction term in
model 4 is positive and statistically significant,
supporting Hypothesis 2. To assess the effect size of
founding transportation infrastructure as a moder-
ator, we drew on the estimated equation in model 4
(exp[0.234  founding branching policy  0.297 
founding branching policy  founding transporta-
tion infrastructure]). All else being equal, when a
bank was founded in a state with a low level of
transportation infrastructure (1 s.d. below the
mean), the bank’s propensity to subsequently ac-
quire other banks did not change significantly
when the state’s branching law changed from unit
banking to statewide branching, as the calculated
multiplier changes from 1 to 0.923. By contrast,
when a bank was founded in a state with a high
level of transportation infrastructure (1 s.d. above
the mean), the bank’s propensity to subsequently
acquire other banks increased significantly when
the state’s branching law changed from unit bank-
ing to statewide branching, as the calculated mul-
tiplier increases by over 1.8 times (from 1 to 1.808).
Model 5 tests Hypothesis 3 regarding the moder-
ating effect of founding urbanization in a state. As
anticipated, the estimated coefficient for the inter-
action term in model 5 is positive and statistically
significant, supporting Hypothesis 3. The finding
suggests that although banks founded in states al-
lowing statewide branching were more likely to
acquire other banks after deregulation began in
1978 than those founded under other conditions,
this effect was stronger for banks founded in states
with higher urbanization.
Models 6 to 9 examine the imprinting effect of
the political culture. As discussed above, since the
political culture could affect banks’ development of
capabilities for managing dispersed units only
when branching was allowed, and since resistance
to bank branching was stronger under high levels of
the political culture variables we examined, we
believed that it was meaningful to only hypothesize
the moderating effect of founding political culture.
In keeping with our reasoning, the main effects of
founding Grange membership, agrarian presence,
and Progressive presence are not statistically sig-
nificant. Model 6 tests Hypothesis 4, regarding the
moderating effect of founding Grange membership.
The estimated coefficient for the interaction term in
model 5 is statistically significant with the antici-
pated negative sign, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Model 7 tests Hypothesis 5, regarding the moderat-
ing effect of founding agrarian presence. As ex-
pected, the estimated coefficient for the interaction
term is negative and statistically significant, sup-
porting Hypothesis 5. Model 8 tests Hypothesis 6,
regarding the moderating effect of founding Pro-
gressive presence. The estimated coefficient for the
interaction term is negative and significant (p 
.10), marginally supporting Hypothesis 6. These
findings suggest that, although a bank founded in a
state allowing statewide branching was more likely
than other banks to subsequently acquire other
banks, the impact of such imprinting became
weaker in states with stronger levels of the found-
ing political culture conditions encouraging resis-
tance to the geographical expansion of banks, all
else being equal.
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Model 9 tests the combined effect of the three
political culture conditions. As shown, although
the three interaction terms still have the expected
negative sign, only the effect for founding Grange
membership is statistically significant. We suggest
that the results should be interpreted as follows:
Table 2 shows that the three founding political
cultural conditions do not have highly positive cor-
relations with each other (the highest correlation
coefficient is .25), indicating that they are indeed
distinct from each other to some extent. However,
this does not mean that the effects of the political
cultural conditions at founding on banks’ geo-
graphical expansion, eventually, on their acquisi-
tion activities can simply add up; even if the three
founding conditions simultaneously affect a bank,
the bank could sufficiently respond to the resis-
tance pressure from the three sources with the same
decision of reducing or stopping geographical ex-
pansion. Thus, to consider the separate effect of the
three founding political cultural conditions, one
should refer to models 6 to 8. However, model 9
does provide some additional information about
the influence of founding political culture environ-
ment as a whole. The finding that founding Grange
membership appears to have a stronger effect than
both founding agrarian and Progressive presence
suggests that it is organized social movements that
constitute the stronger resistance to banks’ geo-
graphical expansion. But note as well that the com-
bined effect of the three founding conditions is
significantly bigger than that of each of the three
founding conditions, as indicated by comparing the
log-likelihood of model 9 with the same value for
models 6 to 8 separately, suggesting that a political
culture of resistance to large organizations reflects a
broader environmental force than any of these in-
dividual measures taps.
Supplementary Analyses
Recall that our theorizing suggests the following
causal process: founding institutional conditions
leads to banks’ geographical dispersion, which
leads to capabilities for managing dispersed units,
which leads to subsequent acquisition (see also
Figure 3). We were not able to measure the under-
lying capabilities but relied on our historical data
to provide qualitative evidence for our mecha-
nisms. The findings that support our corollary hy-
potheses also help flesh out the proposed mecha-
nism. Therefore, even without directly measuring
banks’ underlying capabilities, we are fairly confi-
dent that the observed results in Table 3 are gener-
ated by the proposed mechanism.
But to further strengthen this conclusion, we
conducted supplementary analyses. We had sys-
tematic data with which to measure geographical
dispersion as the antecedent of banks’ capabilities
for managing dispersed units, therefore allowing us
to more directly tap into the proposed mechanism.
We measured the extent of banks’ geographical dis-
persion with a new variable, founding location dis-
persion, which refers to the percentage of bank
locations in a state that were outside of a bank’s
headquarters location at its founding. Information
for this measurement came from apposite issues of
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. If the founding insti-
tutional conditions indeed affected banks’ tendency
to expand geographically, adding this new variable to
our models in Table 3 should have at least partially
mediated the effects of founding institutional and
other environmental conditions on banks’ propensity
to acquire other banks. Typically, mediation is shown
when the addition of a new independent variable to a
regression significantly reduces the effect of a vari-
able already in the equation, and the new variable is
significantly predicted by the variable whose effect
size shrinks (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
The results presented in Table 4 are striking.10 In
keeping with our expectations, adding founding
location dispersion, which is statistically signifi-
cant with a positive sign, entirely washes out the
effects of founding branching policy and founding
urbanization, agrarian presence, and Progressive
presence, although not those of founding transpor-
tation infrastructure and Grange membership.
Given that our analyses controlled for bank size as
well as other factors, we cannot conceive of any
plausible alternative to banks’ capabilities for the
management of dispersed units that could have
linked their geographical dispersion and subse-
quent acquisition activities. These supplementary
analyses provide strong evidence of the suggested
mechanism and make us more confident about our
interpretations of the observed effects of founding
institutional conditions in Table 3.11
10 Banks that were founded between 1993 and 2000
were excluded from this analysis because the govern-
ment did not publish information on the geographic dis-
tribution of branches after 1992. Results presented in
Table 3 are the same when using this reduced sample.
11 We also conducted formal mediation analysis
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) to confirm this effect. The Sobel
test examining the extent to which location dispersion
mediated the effect of branching law on acquisition re-
turned a p-value of .00000754, strongly supporting our
idea that it is through geographic dispersion and associ-
ated branch management capabilities that founding con-
ditions have their effects.
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TABLE 4
Results of Random-Effects Logistic Regression Analyses of Bank Acquisitions, 1978–2001a
Variable 1 2 3
Founding conditions
Location dispersion 1.051*
(0.232)
0.637**
(0.278)
0.911*
(0.290)
H1: Branching policy 0.162
(0.106)
0.148
(0.108)
0.174
(0.108)
H2: Branching policy  transportation 0.208*
(0.077)H3: Branching policy  urbanization 0.280
(0.347)
H4: Branching policy  Grange membership
H5: Branching policy  agrarian presence
H6: Branching policy  Progressive votes
Transportation infrastructure 0.107†
(0.058)
0.120**
(0.058)
0.103†
(0.058)
Urbanization 0.592
(0.397)
0.458
(0.400)
0.460
(0.430)
Grange membership 0.008
(0.011)
0.007
(0.011)
0.008
(0.011)
Agrarian presence 1.150
(1.105)
0.702
(1.118)
0.960
(1.134)
Progressive presence 0.245
(0.511)
0.271
(0.512)
0.266
(0.513)
Founding bank density 0.148**
(0.058)
0.112†
(0.060)
0.143**
(0.059)
Organizational controls
Income/assets, t 1 4.630**
(1.890)
4.554**
(1.885)
4.630**
(1.889)
Bank total assets, t 1b 0.766*
(0.025)
0.767*
(0.025)
0.767*
(0.025)
Headquarters in MSA 0.053
(0.067)
0.054
(0.067)
0.054
(0.067)
Bank ageb 0.001
(0.135)
0.026
(0.134)
0.023
(0.137)
Multibank holding company 0.863*
(0.072)
0.868*
(0.072)
0.866*
(0.072)
Previous acquisitions 0.571*
(0.088)
0.566*
(0.088)
0.568*
(0.088)
Early New York bank 0.288
(0.489)
0.303
(0.489)
0.300
(0.489)
Years under statewide banking 0.003
(0.002)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
Environmental controls
State branching policy 0.255*
(0.081)
0.232*
(0.082)
0.251*
(0.082)
Interstate banking policy 0.223**
(0.106)
0.225**
(0.106)
0.220**
(0.106)
State per capita income 0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
State urbanization 0.458
(0.526)
0.546
(0.526)
0.477
(0.527)
Number of banks, t 1 0.193*
(0.074)
0.232*
(0.076)
0.193*
(0.074)
Average bank size, t 1 0.455*
(0.056)
0.453*
(0.056)
0.449*
(0.057)
Number of acquisitions, t 1 0.019*
(0.003)
0.019*
(0.003)
0.019*
(0.003)
State square miles 0.002
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
Statewide banking in 1978 0.643†
(0.337)
0.659†
(0.337)
0.648†
(0.338)
State average farm size 0.100
(0.063)
0.121†
(0.064)
0.105†
(0.063)
Constant 5.785*
(1.190)
5.771*
(1.188)
5.784*
(1.190)
Observations 199,956 199,956 199,956
Number of groups (banks) 22,253 22,253 22,253
Log-likelihood 9,413.2 9,409.5 9,412.9
a Acquisition  1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b Logarithm.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
Two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 4
Continued
Variable 4 5 6 7 8
Founding conditions
Location dispersion 0.890*
(0.241)
1.056*
(0.274)
1.011*
(0.234)
0.941*
(0.278)
0.673**
(0.297)
H1: Branching policy 0.109
(0.110)
0.162
(0.106)
0.156
(0.107)
0.100
(0.110)
0.083
(0.114)
H2: Branching policy  transportation 0.337*
(0.113)
H3: Branching policy  urbanization 0.550
(0.691)
H4: Branching policy  Grange membership 0.053**
(0.022)
0.054**
(0.023)
0.044†
(0.023)
H5: Branching policy  agrarian presence 0.058
(1.820)
1.117
(1.876)
8.935**
(3.706)
H6: Branching policy  Progressive votes 1.564
(1.264)
1.354
(1.267)
0.889
(1.283)
Transportation infrastructure 0.092
(0.058)
0.108†
(0.058)
0.107†
(0.058)
0.094
(0.058)
0.120**
(0.059)
Urbanization 0.609
(0.397)
0.594
(0.403)
0.588
(0.397)
0.645
(0.402)
0.432
(0.457)
Grange membership 0.017
(0.012)
0.008
(0.011)
0.007
(0.011)
0.017
(0.012)
0.015
(0.012)
Agrarian presence 1.193
(1.104)
1.150
(1.105)
1.137
(1.107)
1.180
(1.108)
0.071
(1.235)
Progressive presence 0.237
(0.510)
0.244
(0.512)
0.070
(0.562)
0.047
(0.562)
0.019
(0.565)
Founding bank density 0.123**
(0.059)
0.148**
(0.059)
0.148**
(0.058)
0.124**
(0.059)
0.074
(0.061)
Organizational controls
Income/assets, t 1 4.634**
(1.887)
4.631**
(1.890)
4.669**
(1.889)
4.680**
(1.888)
4.627**
(1.886)
Bank total assets, t 1b 0.766*
(0.025)
0.766*
(0.025)
0.767*
(0.025)
0.766*
(0.025)
0.767*
(0.025)
Headquarters in MSA 0.051
(0.067)
0.053
(0.067)
0.050
(0.067)
0.048
(0.067)
0.050
(0.067)
Bank ageb 0.007
(0.134)
0.007
(0.135)
0.009
(0.135)
0.006
(0.135)
0.031
(0.138)
Multibank holding company 0.864*
(0.072)
0.863*
(0.072)
0.863*
(0.072)
0.863*
(0.072)
0.866*
(0.072)
Previous acquisitions 0.574*
(0.088)
0.571*
(0.088)
0.575*
(0.088)
0.577*
(0.088)
0.569*
(0.088)
Early New York bank 0.312
(0.488)
0.288
(0.489)
0.286
(0.488)
0.308
(0.488)
0.331
(0.489)
Years under statewide banking 0.005**
(0.003)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.005**
(0.003)
0.007*
(0.003)
Environmental controls
State branching policy 0.254*
(0.081)
0.255*
(0.082)
0.253*
(0.082)
0.257*
(0.082)
0.242*
(0.082)
Interstate banking policy 0.227**
(0.105)
0.223**
(0.106)
0.225**
(0.106)
0.229**
(0.105)
0.228**
(0.106)
State per capita income 0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
State urbanization 0.436
(0.524)
0.458
(0.526)
0.466
(0.526)
0.443
(0.524)
0.642
(0.527)
Number of banks, t 1 0.226*
(0.075)
0.193*
(0.074)
0.196*
(0.074)
0.228*
(0.075)
0.278*
(0.078)
Average bank size, t 1 0.462*
(0.056)
0.455*
(0.057)
0.450*
(0.057)
0.462*
(0.057)
0.475*
(0.058)
Number of acquisitions, t 1 0.018*
(0.003)
0.019*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
0.018*
(0.003)
State square miles 0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.000
(0.007)
Statewide banking in 1978 0.654†
(0.337)
0.643†
(0.337)
0.647†
(0.337)
0.655†
(0.337)
0.666**
(0.337)
State average farm size 0.116†
(0.063)
0.100
(0.063)
0.101
(0.063)
0.114†
(0.063)
0.136**
(0.064)
Constant 5.585*
(1.188)
5.784*
(1.190)
5.826*
(1.188)
5.609*
(1.188)
7.539*
(1.119)
Observations 199,956 199,956 199,956 199,956 199,956
Number of groups (banks) 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253
Log-likelihood 9,410.5 9,413.2 9,412.5 9,409.7 9,403.8
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DISCUSSION
This study examined how founding institutional
environments, in particular public policy and po-
litical culture, leave an imprint on organizations.
Unlike prior work (Kimberly, 1975; Meyer &
Brown, 1977; Tucker et al., 1990), our investigation
focused on articulating the intraorganizational
mechanisms that link founding institutional envi-
ronments and contemporary organizational behav-
iors. Our theoretical arguments suggest that found-
ing institutional environments, by delineating
boundaries for organizations’ behaviors, likely lead
organizations to develop particular capabilities at
founding, which are then institutionalized and per-
sist within the organizations. Moreover, these im-
printed intraorganizational capabilities may be ex-
apted for new uses after environmental shifts and
thus have different contemporary manifestations.
Our investigation of the imprinting of branching
policy and political culture in the U.S. commercial
banking industry provides general support for our
theory. Our findings suggest that banks founded in
a state allowing statewide branching were more
likely than banks that were not to acquire other
banks following the 1978 deregulation and that this
relationship was enhanced when a bank was
founded in a state with more advanced transporta-
tion infrastructure and higher urbanization. Fur-
ther, when statewide branching was allowed at
founding, a political culture, manifested as the
presence of organized Granges, agrarian actors, and
Progressives suppressed the effect of founding
branching policy on banks’ subsequent propensity
to acquire other banks. These results as a whole
suggest that (1) both founding branching policy and
political culture affect banks’ development of capa-
bilities to manage geographically dispersed units at
the time of the banks’ founding and (2) such im-
printed capabilities are manifested in banks’ sub-
sequent propensity to engage in acquisitions,
which requires that very set of capabilities. Below,
we outline several major implications of this study.
Implications for Imprinting Research
This study makes several contributions to im-
printing research. First, our work reorients imprint-
ing research to focus on founding institutional en-
vironments as opposed to the more frequently
studied material environments. We examined two
founding institutional environments, public policy
and political culture, and showed that they im-
printed banks, while controlling for the most com-
mon measure of material environments, organiza-
tional density (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). Moreover,
we enrich understanding of the lasting effects of
founding institutional environments by conducting
much finer-grained analyses than the relatively few
existing studies include (e.g., Kimberly, 1975;
Meyer & Brown, 1977; Tucker et al., 1990).
Second, in this study we not only hypothesized
and observed a link between founding institutional
conditions and subsequent organizational behav-
iors, but also articulated and tested the intraorgan-
izational mechanisms giving rise to this link.
The intraorganizational mechanism in our context
is banks’ capabilities for managing dispersed
branches, which include, as described in Table 1,
the various monitoring infrastructures, organiza-
tional design elements, business processes, and
cultural templates developed in response to found-
ing institutional conditions. These capabilities
were institutionalized within banks and impacted
their subsequent behaviors, such as acquisition.
Thus, we advance imprinting research by directly
addressing Johnson’s (2007) criticism that most im-
printing studies remain unspecific or speculative
about such mechanisms.
Third, this study shows that imprinting is not
merely manifested in organizational structures or
strategies established at founding that are main-
tained unchanged or only partially changed over
time, which have been the focus of previous stud-
ies. Rather, our findings indicate that organizations
may show contemporary behaviors and outcomes
that are different from what the organizations did at
founding, yet are still the result of some deep and
unobservable intraorganizational capabilities es-
tablished when the organizations adapted to found-
ing environmental conditions. Specifically, we
found that banks founded in states where branch-
ing was possible developed multiunit management
capabilities that subsequently enabled them to ac-
quire other firms in an environment favoring acqui-
sitions. This represents an organizational manifes-
tation of a more general phenomenon, exaptation,
which was first observed in evolutionary biology
(Gould, 1980, 1991) and then later in other domains
such as the evolution of technologies (Dew et al.,
2004). As Gould noted, “No conceptual tool can be
more important than the clear separation of histor-
ical origin and current utility. The false conceptual
passage from present function to initial construc-
tion ranks with the post hoc fallacy and the con-
fusion of correlation with cause as primary errors of
reasoning about temporal sequences” (1991: 45;
emphasis in original). As shown in this study, the
conceptual rationale underlying exaptation is
particularly conducive to understanding imprint-
ing phenomena by establishing the link between
historical origin and contemporary manifesta-
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tion(s) that often becomes obscure with the passage
of time.
Our finding of exaptation has even broader im-
plications for understanding organizational adapta-
tion, which is inherently affected by changes at
multiple levels (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). It is
generally believed that inertia and stability may be
the rule at both organizational and environmental
levels, so that change at either level is seen as
detrimental to organizational survival because mis-
fit between organizations and environments results
(Baum, 1996; Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Hannan &
Freeman, 1977). But we contend that this perspec-
tive confounds historical genesis and current util-
ity, and that the extent to which historical changes
result in selective pressure has more to do with the
degree of alignment, or match, between origin and
current use, and less with external changes per se.
Our study suggests that an organization can suc-
cessfully navigate environmental changes to the
extent to which it has “features [that can be] co-
opted for their present role from some other origin”
(Dew et al., 2004: 69). Thus, external changes are
not necessarily always detrimental, and there may
not necessarily be a “liability of aging” per se
(Ranger-Moore, 1997). Baum (1996) similarly ar-
gued that there was a need for selection-oriented
theories to go beyond age dependence to study
some of the underlying mechanisms involved in
understanding how age influences selection, and
we feel that understanding exaptation is an impor-
tant step in that direction.
Implications for Institutional Research
This study, with its focus on founding institu-
tional environments, also contributes to institu-
tional research more generally. First, to date, insti-
tutional scholars have mainly examined how
institutional pressures affect organizations during
the period when these pressures are exerted. But
we demonstrate how past institutional pressures
continue to shape organizational behaviors long
after they have vanished from an institutional en-
vironment. Our research thus suggests that institu-
tional influences on organizations are chronologi-
cally multilayered, so that researchers need to
attend not only to current institutional environ-
ments but also to historically distant ones to fully
appreciate institutional influences.
Recognizing that past institutional conditions
may continue influencing organizations also en-
ables one to understand other important institu-
tional processes. Specifically, we show here that
external conditions affect organizations to the ex-
tent that the organizations engage in adaptive re-
sponses that may be institutionalized inside them-
selves to exert persistent influence even after the
institutional environment has changed. Thus, we
depict a process that penetrates multiple institu-
tional levels and bridges actors external and inter-
nal to organizations. Moreover, such a process view
leads us to uncover that institutional conditions
may have unintended consequences for organiza-
tions, which, as demonstrated in this study, may be
brought about by a rarely attended-to mechanism,
exaptation, as discussed above.
Second, this study sheds light on how political
values and beliefs make inroads into organizations
at founding and are manifested in subsequent or-
ganizational practices and behaviors (Selznick,
1949). Some organizational studies have focused
on the implications of culture more generally (Dob-
bin, 1994; Lounsbury, 2007), yet how political cul-
ture factors influence organizational strategies and
forms has received relatively less attention until
very recently (Haveman et al., 2007). But political
culture, with its focus on defining how political
and economic activities should be organized in a
society (Tindall & Shi, 1999; Wilson, 1992), is in-
herently related to organizations and should con-
stitute an important area of future research. Thus,
this study constitutes a much needed effort to en-
rich understanding of political culture and organi-
zations. Our historical analysis shows that the in-
fluence of political culture on organizations often
takes multiple forms. External actors with certain
political beliefs may organize to influence them
(e.g., the Granges) or simply engage in ongoing
individual resistance (e.g., farmers’ avoidance of
large banks). The influence of political culture may
also take place internally, when actors inside or-
ganizations (e.g., bank founders) share certain po-
litical beliefs and thus construct organizations re-
flecting such beliefs. Accordingly, the influence of
political culture can be simultaneously character-
ized by contestation and value infusion, the com-
bination of which generates the profound impact
we observed in this study.
Third, although there is substantial work exam-
ining the effects of contemporary public policy on
organizations, ours is one of the first studies to
show that founding public policy is also essential
to understanding contemporary organizational be-
haviors. Stinchcombe observed that “groups, insti-
tutions, laws, population characteristics, and sets
of social relations” (1965: 142; emphasis added) are
all significant parts of firms’ founding environ-
ments that will have a subsequent impact. Yet this
contention has not been firmly established empiri-
cally at the organizational level, although related
studies suggest that initial policy or legal environ-
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ments set market templates that are likely to persist
(Dobbin, 1994; Fligstein, 1996). Our study suggests
that uncovering some of the lingering effects of
founding legal environments would be a fruitful
avenue for future research.
Limitations and Future Research
This study has some limitations inherent in
large-scale historical analysis like ours. First, we
proposed that founding institutional conditions in-
duced banks to develop certain intraorganizational
capabilities that were subsequently institutional-
ized and thus persistently influenced the banks.
Unable to measure this mechanism directly owing
to data unavailability, we labored to flesh it out via
different research strategies such as collecting qual-
itative evidence from bank histories, deriving cor-
ollary hypotheses, and measuring and testing ante-
cedents of banks’ capabilities. Although fairly
confident in our results and conclusions, we admit
that one limitation of this study is that we could not
directly measure banks’ capabilities for managing
branches. We feel that this was a trade-off we had to
make because observing imprinting effects requires
data covering a sufficiently long time period such
that precise measurement is a challenge.
Second, when examining the implications of po-
litical culture, we focused on the elements of polit-
ical culture that were relevant to the expansion of
banks during our study period, and we based our
indicators of these elements on prior studies (e.g.,
Haveman et al., 2007; Marquis & Huang, 2009,
Schneiberg et al., 2008). We recognize that our fo-
cus and indicators may be too narrow to fully ex-
plore all implications of how political culture af-
fects organizations. We believe that there is a need
in future studies for richer characterizations of po-
litical culture, using more precise indicators, to
unpack how political culture affects organizations.
Third, although one interpretation of our theory
and results is that it is difficult to escape the legacy
of one’s past, the rich literature on organizational
learning and change does suggest that at least some
elements of firms’ behaviors are subject to alter-
ation (Greve, 2003). One variable that we included
to control for a potential learning effect was the
number of years a bank had been in a statewide-
branching state; if banks could learn the requisite
coordinating capabilities, greater exposure to state-
wide-branching laws would be expected to have
had a positive effect. However, this variable,
though positive, was not consistently statistically
significant, suggesting that it was the founding con-
ditions and not exposure to the statewide-branch-
ing model over time that had the more profound
effect. Clearly, individual firms and industries are
able to remake themselves, yet the boundary mech-
anisms demarcating when they can or cannot do so
have not yet been established. Future researchers
may want to further explore the fertile interface
between learning and imprinting, as well as that
between change and inertia.
Finally, our data are left-censored; that is, our
sample includes organizations that were founded
before the beginning of the observation window.
Other researchers have argued that this condition
leads to bias in ecological studies because these
organizations have endured previous selection pro-
cesses (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). Although we agree
that left-censoring is not ideal, certain differences
between our study and standard ecological studies
may lessen the concern on this issue. Our research,
unlike ecological research, does not present a life
cycle model and therefore does not focus on the
standard ecological processes of age and size de-
pendence that are directly related to censoring is-
sues (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990). Instead, our focus is
on capabilities that become increasingly important
after a major environmental shift (see Baum [1996]
for why this distinction is important; see Haveman
[1992] for a similar approach). Further, we con-
trolled for variables such as age and existing size
that presumably would reflect the firms’ trajectory
prior to the observation window. Finally, even if
some survivor bias does exist, it is not clear how or
why this would lead to different effects for our key
independent variables.
Conclusion
The lasting effect of founding institutions on
organizational capabilities and strategies after en-
vironmental conditions shift is still not a fully
answered question. But abundant anecdotal and
case-based evidence suggests that understanding a
firm’s or an industry’s historical environments can
inform understanding of present growth and struc-
ture. A well-known example of founding capabili-
ties being a subsequent detriment is how socialist
firms, constrained by their system-specific capabil-
ities, had difficulty in competing in a free market
environment (Kogut & Zander, 2000; Kriauciunas &
Kale, 2006). Or, consider the early development of
airlines such as Southwest and Pacific Southwest
in Texas and California, respectively. Both states
had very favorable laws for founding an airline.
Both also contained large, dispersed population
centers that made air travel an attractive alternative
to surface travel, leading to the success and devel-
opment of early capabilities that set a foundation
for growth (Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996). In the past
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25 years, Southwest has become a major airline,
and Pacific Southwest expanded rapidly before be-
ing acquired by USAir in 1987. Our results are also
consistent with the suggestion that similar early
advantages resulted in the growth of North Carolina
as a U.S. banking center. Banks in this state, such as
Nations Bank, First Union, and Wachovia, likely
took advantage of their early experiences with its
liberal branching policy to develop coordination
capabilities that they subsequently leveraged in the
recent acquisition market (Covington & Ellis, 1993;
Marquis & Huang, 2009). We hope that our study
can stimulate more research into understanding the
historical backgrounds of organizations, recogniz-
ing that organizations are not only products, but
also carriers, of history.
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